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The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination 
in Federally Assisted Low-Rent Housing 
The Public Housing Administration is the federal agency pri-
marily responsible for the administration of the federally assisted 
low-rent housing program.1 Since the expense of constructing low-
rent housing unassisted by federal funds is prohibitive for state or 
local governments,2 this program accounts for practically all low-rent 
housing in the United States.3 Consequently, PHA has exercised, and 
continues to exercise, substantial influence on the development of 
the nation's low-rent housing. 
J. !NTRODUGI'ION 
The Public Housing Administration has candidly admitted that 
nearly three-fourths of the housing projects in its program are either 
all-white or all-Negro.4 Although this percentage is considerably less 
I. The predecessor of the Public Housing Administration (PHA), the United States 
Housing Authority, was created in 1937 to administer the United States Housing Act 
(Housing Act of 1937), 50 Stat. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964). Under Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3 of 1947, 61 Stat. 954, 5 U.S.C. § 133y-16, the Authority was renamed 
the Public Housing Administration and was consolidated with other federal agencies 
into the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA). The functions of HHFA, which 
included within it the Urban Renewal Administration (URA), the Community Facilities 
Administration (CFA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), and the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as PHA, were transferred to the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1965. 79 Stat. 667 (1965). As a 
result, the semi-autonomous status previously enjoyed by PHA has been replaced by 
direct administrative control of the Secretary of HUD in an attempt to streamline the 
functions of HHFA, which has been called by Secretary Weaver an "administrative 
monstrosity." N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1966, p. I, col. 1. 
2. A few states have authorized direct aid to their projects. See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. 
LAws §§ 3505-14 (McKinney 1959). 
3. There are at present over 550,000 occupied homes in the federal program, hous-
ing more than 2¼ million persons. Of those living in public housing, 49% are non-
white, 26% are elderly, 48% are receiving public assistance or benefits, and 72% are 
families with minors. Burstein, Housing Our Low-Income Population: Federal and 
Local Powers and Potentials, IO N.Y.L.F. 464, 465 (1964). 
4. As of March 31, 1963, of all existing projects in the PHA program, 1179 were all-
white, 1174 were all-Negro, and 675 were integrated, PUBLIC HousING ADMINISTRATION, 
TRENDS TOWARD OPEN OCCUPANCY, REP'T No. 12 (1963). Thus, 77.7% of those projects 
were occupied by members of only one race. In comparison, as of January 6, 1965, 1213 
projects were all-white, 942 were all-Negro, and 852 were integrated; thus, 71.8% were 
segregated. (The 1965 figures do not include projects which were integrated white and 
other nonwhite (45), segregated within project by building or site (380), mixed occu-
pancy with limitations or segregated patterns (31), all Latin American (10), or unre-
ported (24).) PHA, Low RENT PROJECr DIRECTORY (1964). For a statistical comparison of 
January 1965, and July 1965, data, see the appendix at the end of this comment. These 
percentages, however, are deceptive in several respects. First, since PHA defines a project 
as "completely integrated" if tenancy includes only one Negro family in an othenvise 
all-white project, or vice versa, id. at v, the number of projects having more than token 
desegregation is open to question. Second, it must be recoguized that a breakdown on a 
project-by-project basis is also misleading, because integrated projects are generally 
located in northern metropolitan areas and are usually larger than the segregated 
projects which are found more often in smaller southern communities. For example, 
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than the one hundred per cent figure existing at, the end of World 
War II,5 it is arguable that any reduction of the figure since that time 
is attributable to state antidiscrimination legislation rather than to 
policies implemented by PHA.6 Despite its dominant position in the 
field and despite proscriptions against discrimination contained in 
the fourteenth amendment, the Executive Order on Equal Oppor-
tunity in Housing,7 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 the 
regulations of PHA itself,9 and a substantial body of case law,10 PHA 
has been unable or unwilling to remedy the extensive discrimination 
now existent in the projects which it oversees.11 
This comment will distinguish segregation and discrimination; 
it assumes that federal antidiscrimination policies are directed for the 
most part toward the latter, and will attempt to demonstrate that 
PHA's actions to date have allowed the perpetuation of intentional 
segregation by local authorities.12 The course of action which this 
the sixty projects in New York City, 58 of which are integrated and two of which arc 
all-Negro, contain 55,206 units under management. In Georgia, by comparison, the 494 
projects, 491 of which are either all-white, all nonwhite or segregated within the project 
by building or site, contain 31,457 units under management. For a more detailed 
analysis of geographic considerations, see nqte 12 infra. 
5. U.S. CoMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, REPORT 160 (1963). 
6. For example, New York, the initiator of state antidiscrimination legislation,· 
maintains 92 integrated projects, 13 all-white projects, and 5 all-Negro projects. PHA, 
Low-RENT PROJEcr DIREcroRY 13-16 (1964). On the other hand, Illinois, which has 
enacted no private-housing antidiscrimination legislation but has passed a public and 
urban renewal housing statute without provision for a special enforcement agency, 
maintains 54 integrated projects, 86 all-white projects and 37 all-Negro projects, Id, at 
98-111. Georgia, which has enacted no antidiscrimination legislation of any kind, 
maintains no integrated projects, 204 all-white projects and 194 all-Negro projects. Id, 
at 53-70. As of September 1965, eighteen states and the District of Columbia had enacted 
legislation prohibiting discrimination in public housing. HOUSING AND HOI\IE FINANCE 
AGENCY, FAIR HOUSING LAws 10 (1964); Anti-Defamation League, 1965 State Civil 
Rights Legislation (1965). 
7. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962). 
8, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). 
9. 30 Fed. Reg. 132 (1965), amending 24 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1964); 24 C.F.R. §§ l!iOQ.6 
(1964). PHA is also bound by the regulations which HHFA has issued pursuant to Title 
VI, 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12 (1964), most of which are incorporated by reference in 30 Fed. 
Reg. 132 (1965). 
10. See, e.g., Heyward v. Public Housing Admin., 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956); De• 
troit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955). 
11. Panel on Housing and the Neighborhood, Planning Session for the White House 
Conference "To Fulfill These Rights" 3 (1965) ("The housing agencies have done prac-
tically nothing to implement Title VI as it applies to public housing ••• .''). 
12. See notes 39 and 46 infra and accompanying text. PHA maintains that merely 
because a project is all-Negro or all-white does not necessarily reflect discriminatory 
tenant- or site-selection procedures on the part of local authorities. This may be true 
in smaller towns and rural areas in the north and west, since the absence of Negroes 
in the community will obviously cause a project to be all-white and thus "segregated" 
in a non-pejorative sense. For example, of the four projects under management in 
Idaho, three are all-white and the fourth houses both whites and Indians. Punuc 
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, Low-RENT HOUSING DIRECTORY 171 (1964). Thus, in this respect 
the statistics presented in note 4 supra should probably be reevaluated and their harsh-
ness ameliorated. In the south, however, PHA's position seems patently indefensible, 
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comment suggests PHA pursue in effectuating present federal anti-
discrimination policies is designed primarily to end current and past 
practices of intentional segregation by both local authorities and 
PHA. The ·writer thus takes no position on the separate question 
whether PHA should undertake, or is now able to undertake, a policy 
of affirmatively encouraging integration, as opposed to desegregation, 
of low-rent housing projects. Furthermore, this comment will attempt 
to delineate the historical basis for present discrimination, discuss 
the methods utilized by PHA thus far to correct the effects of past 
discriminatory policies, and suggest means by which PHA might 
better effectuate the duty placed upon it by federal policies against 
discrimination. 
II. HISTORY AND OPERATION OF PHA 
The creation of the predecessor of PHA, the United States Hous-
ing Authority, to implement the Housing Act of 193713 was the first 
congressional action aimed principally at the provision of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing for those who could not afford to pay for 
it on the open market.14 The doubtful constitutionality of direct fed-
eral administration of the program15 and a desire to enhance the at-
tractiveness of the bill to a Congress increasingly conscious of the 
rapidly expanding powers of the federal government led the sponsors 
of the bill to place primary responsibility for the administration of 
the program in the hands of local and state governments and tQ re-
since the prevalence of segregated site selection is immediately obvious when the place-
ment of projects in each community is examined. The invariable practice is that in 
those communities which have only one project it is segregated by site or building, in 
those which have two projects one is all-Negro and the other is all-white, and in those 
with more than two projects a combination of both methods is present. Moreover, the 
impact of segregated site selection is not restricted to the south but extends into the 
larger northern cities as well. See the discussion of New York City's problems, note 45 
infra. 
13. See note 1 supra. 
14. The Housing Act of 1937, however, had been preceded by federal legislation 
which, although enacted to satisfy other congressional goals, had indirectly provided 
shelter for certain segments of the nation. For example, during World War I the United 
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation and the United States Housing 
Corporation combined efforts to construct housing for workers in war industries; in the 
early 1930's the National Industrial Recovery Act provided for the construction of low-
rent housing in order to increase employment. 
15. Lower federal courts had disallowed the exercise of the federal eminent domain 
power under the NIRA low-rent housing provisions discussed note 13 supra, and thus 
had effectively halted the operation of the federal program. United States v. Certain 
Lands, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky. 1935), aff'd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.), dismissed on motion 
of Sol. Gen., 294 U.S. 735 (1936). State courts, on the other hand, had extended judicial 
approval to similar condemnation procedures of state governments. New York Housing 
Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936). An interesting analysis of the 
considerations which led the solicitor general to dismiss the Louisville litigation is 
found in EBERSTEIN, PUBLIC HOUSING 28-56 (1940). The Housing Act of 1937 was even-
tually held constitutional by the Supreme Court eight years after its passage. City of 
Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945). · 
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serve for the federal government a role of advice and approval.16 This 
basic approach has, for the most part, been continued to date,17 al-
though cries of bureaucratic strangulation are frequently voiced by 
local agencies.18 
In order for a municipality to receive federal funds for low-rent 
housing, the state legislature must enact enabling legislation provid-
ing for the establishment of local housing authorities.10 When a local 
authority is created, it seeks preliminary loans from PHA for survey 
and planning costs.20 Before PHA disburses such temporary loans, 
it must be satisfied that the local authority has demonstrated that the 
need for low-rent housing is not being met by private enterprise and 
that a gap of at least twenty per cent exists between the upper rental 
limits tentatively set for admission to the projects and the lowest 
rents which are being demanded on the average for decent housing 
by private enterprise.21 The local authority must also enter into a 
cooperation agreement with PHA, and the local governing body 
must authorize the local authority's application for funds.22 
After approval of its tentative program by PHA, the local authority 
sells temporary notes, secured unconditionally by PHA, to private 
investors for the early stages of land acquisition and construction. 
Once development costs can be accurately estimated, however, the 
local authority foregoes temporary financing and issues to private 
investors long-term bonds guaranteed by the annual contributions 
provided under a contract between the local authority and PHA.23 
16. This policy is currently reflected in the first section of the Housing Act of 1937 
as amended: "It is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public housing 
agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent 
housing program, including responsibility for the establishment of rents and eligibility 
requirements (subject to the approval of the Authority) •••• " 50 Stat. 888 (1937), 42 
U.S.C. § 1401 (1964). (Emphasis added.) 
17. See note 16 supra. 
18. FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 146-49 (1958). 
19. All but three state-Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming-have enacted such en-
abling legislation. Burstein, supra note 3, at 467. 
20. The mere creation of a local authority is insufficient to enable the authority to 
become eligible for federal funds. The governing body of the locality must adopt a reso-
lution proclaiming the need for low-rent housing and must approve the application of 
the local authority for preliminary loans. 63 Stat. 422 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a) 
(1964). 
21. See 63 Stat. 422 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1964). 
22. Ibid. 
23. Statutory limits are placed on the amount which can be expended for dwelling 
construction and equipment. No specific limits have been placed on acquisition and 
clearance costs, however, and it has been alleged that local authorities, which arc find-
ing it difficult to meet what they consider to be unrealistically low dwelling and con-
struction equipment costs, have juggled funds received under clearance and acquisition 
loans in order to channel more funds into dwelling construction, The Housing Act of 
1965 may alleviate this situation, however, by increasing relevant statutory limits. Cost 
limitations on each room were raised from $2000 to $2500, 79 Stat. 451 (U.S. CODE CONG. 
8: AD. NEWS 2385 (Sept. 5, 1965)), and the aggregate annual contributions were increased 
$47,000,000 for the years 1966-68. In any event, PHA does possess a somewhat amorphous 
ultimate authority to approve the amounts disbursed to local authorities pursuant to 
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These contributions cover the annual payment for amortization and 
interest on the permanent financing and assure payment of the full 
development cost of the project.24 However, the local authority must 
agree to exempt the property upon which the project is constructed 
from taxation25 and to provide other governmental services, such as 
parks and recreational facilities.26 Moreover, if the rents collected 
from the projects exceed the overhead and administrative costs to 
which they are applied, the annual contributions are reduced in an 
amount equal to the excess. 
III. INITIAL CAUSES OF DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING 
Because the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson27 
retained substantial vitality when the first low-rent housing legisla-
tion was enacted,28 it appears that little if any consideration was 
initially accorded to the constitutional propriety of intentionally 
segregating public h(?using projects. Moreover, the nearly uniform 
support for the original public housing legislation by southern law-
makers would probably have vanished immediately if the suggestion 
of racially mixed housing had been seriously pursued.29 Finally, 
because the 1937 Act placed primary responsibility for the adminis-
tration of the program in the hands of local authorities, the projects 
tended to reflect the segregated living patterns of the communities 
in which they were constructed, since site selection merely involved 
placing one project in the Negro neighborhood and one in the white 
neighborhood.30 
the general provision that "economy shall be promoted both in construction and ad-
ministration." 50 Stat. 895 (1937), 42 U.S.C. § 1415(5) (1964). 
24. Because municipal-bond interest is not subject to federal income and most state 
taxation, financing by this method is substantially more economical than payment of 
funds by PHA to the local authority directly, since PHA would be forced to borrow 
the requisite funds from the Treasury at highei: interest rates. See Burstein, supra 
note 3, at 475. 
25. 63 Stat. 428 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § l 410(h) (1964). 
26. These services, and others, constitute the cooperation agreement which the 
locality must enter into with the local housing authority. See 63 Stat. 422 (1949), 42 
u.s.c. § 1415(7)(b) (1964). 
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
28. The only case which had shaken the foundations of the Plessy decision was 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), which had held that the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment forbade state enactment of racial zoning regulations. 
The argument could have been made that Buchanan prohibited intentionally segregated 
public housing because in both cases-racial zoning and intentionally segregated public 
housing-the object of the state's action was to restrict each race to its own living 
accommodations. See Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 517 (1959). 
29. See Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public Housing, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 
163, 167 (1962). 
30. Several courts upheld the right of states to operate housing developments on a 
separate-but-equal basis, each in its own neighborhood. See, e.g., Favors v. Randall, 
40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Denard v. Housing Authority, 203 Ark. 1050, 159 
S.W .2d 764 (1942); Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W .2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1940). 
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Because segregation of races was generally accepted in the early 
years of PHA activity as a legitimate method of operation for both 
the governmental and private sectors of our society, it is difficult to 
reproach PHA for initially permitting the establishment of segregated 
living patterns in public housing. However, the Supreme Court's 
decisiop.s in Shelley v. Kraemer31 in 1948 and Brown v. Board of 
Education32 in 1954 made it abundantly clear that governmentally 
supported segregation would no longer be permitted. Indeed, sev-
eral lower federal courts during the period from 1948 to 1954 spe-
cifically found that the intentional segregation of public housing 
was intolerable under the fourteenth amendment.33 Nevertheless, 
PHA continued to acquiesce in the perpetuation by local authorities 
of segregated facilities,- a phenomenon which may be explained in 
several ways. 
Compared to other federal housing programs which have been 
accorded general acceptance, low-rent housing has not, until very 
recently perhaps,34 enjoyed more than an orphan's status. Support of 
low-rent housing by powerful interest groups has been notably lack-
ing, while opposition has been both vocal and well organized.all In 
31. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
33. See, e.g., Vann v. Toledo Metro. Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. 
Ohio 1953); Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954). Contra, West v. Housing Authority, 211 
Ga. 133, 84 S.E.2d 30 (1954); Miers v. Housing Authority, 266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. 
App.), certified questions answered, 153 Tex. 236, 266 S.W.2d 842 (1954) (questions re• 
lated to different issues). After the Brown decisions every final state and lower federal 
court decision on the merits has denied the existence of state power to provide separate 
but equal public housing. See Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 518 (1959). 
1 34. Sec note 22 supra. In addition to the renewed emphasis placed upon low-rent 
housing by the present Administration, the revival of two often neglected approaches 
to public housing suggests that the program's aims may soon be accorded greater 
acceptability. First, more emphasis is now being placed upon integrating public housing 
with other housing programs, reflected by the creation of HUD, see note 1 supra, and 
by governmental attempts to place low income housing tenants in middle income 
neighborhoods. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 1, col. 6. Second, local authorities arc being 
encouraged to avoid large groupings of public housing projects and to concentrate on 
smaller, more dispersed units throughout the community. Letter From Herman D. 
Hillman, Regional Director, Department of Housing and Urban Development, to the 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1966, p. 28, col. 3. Although these methods originally met some 
opposition, that opposition may be waning. Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1966, p. 20, col. 7. 
It is hoped that in the long run much of the present antipathy expressed toward public 
housing may be removed since the institutionalization and concentration of lower in• 
come families in particular areas of the community will not be as accentuated as it is 
at present. 
35. Although many "liberal" organizations offer lip service to the desirability of 
public housing, supporters who actively encourage expanded public housing and defend 
current programs are for the most part either those whose employment is intimately 
associated with the continuance of such programs, such as the National Association of 
Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) and the National Association of Inter• 
group Relations Officers (NAIRO), or loose confederations of such "liberal" organi• 
zations as the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCADH), 
Moreover, even those who support the underlying theory of public housing expend a 
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fact, between 1949 and 1952 the public housing program barely 
survived an intensive congressional onslaught;86 it was only the sup-
port of southern Democrats which prevented the program's demise.87 
As a result, it appears that public housing officials were not eager to 
attempt a program for removal of existing discrimination which 
might have alienated the southern lawmakers and thus jeopardized 
the entire public housing program.38 
Moreover, until the issuance of the Executive Order in November 
1962 and the enactment of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
PHA lacked well-defined authority enabling it to pressure local 
authorities even if it had so desired. In any event, perhaps the prin-
cipal explanation for the continuation of discrimination in public 
housing was that PHA appears to have viewed itself as having carried 
substantial portion of their eneripes criticizing the manner in which public housing 
is no,ir being operated. See The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, Architectural 
Forum, June 1957, p. 139. In addition, labor union support of public housing seems 
to stem more from the opportunity for "featherbedding" in such projects than from a 
bona fide desire to provide housing for the indigent. See The Wall Street Journal, 
April 10, 1958, p. 19, col. 2. Furthermore, public housing is often a political plum for 
politicians. See generally .ABRAMS, PUBLIC HOUSING IN POLITICS (1950). In contrast, effec-
tive political opposition has been conducted by the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards (NAREB) and the United States Chamber of Commerce. Lobbying pressures 
are not restricted to the halls of Congress; the attempted establishment of a low-cost 
housing program in a municipality invariably results in vociferous objections by the 
local building and real estate interests, supported by the natioµal organizations men-
tioned above. The members of organizations such as NAREB are generally small 
businessmen rather than large corporations since the latter, able to submit the lowest 
bids for housing project construction, are often the primary beneficiaries of the govern-
ment's housing contracts. See generally Mulvihill, supra note 29, at 164-74. 
36. During this period three attempts were made to end the federal public housing 
program, and on two occasions the public housing opponents came within five votes 
of success. 101 CONG. REc. 12139 (1955). In fact, in 1952 the House voted to end the 
public housing program for one year. IOI CONG. R.Ec, 12139 (1955). During the Eisen-
hower administration, the executive department also opposed the extension of public 
housing. The President's Advisory Committee on Housing, established in 1953, pro-
posed several changes in the federal program which would have drastically affected 
low-cost housing. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITI'EE ON GOVERNMENT HOUSING 
POLICIES, R.EPoRT OF SUBCOMMITI'EE ON HOUSING FOR Low INCOME FAMn.ms 267-73 (1953). 
Congressional antipathy to public housing has not been restricted to the early fifties. 
As late as 1961, bills were introduced calling for the abolition of public housing. 107 
CoNG, REc. 9957 (daily ed. June 19, 1961); 107 CONG. R.Ec. 10123 (daily ed. June 21, 
1961). The "Great Society," however, has cast its blessing on public housing. See note 
34 supra. 
37. The disaffection of southern Senators apparently began after several state and 
federal district courts found that segregation in low-rent housing violated the fourteenth 
amendment. See, e.g., cases cited note 33 supra. 
38. Fear of unfavorable congressional reaction apparently has not been the only 
reason for PHA's inaction. A former administrator of HHFA, Albert M. Cole, was 
viewed thus by one observer: "As a fighter for public housing, Al Cole has not yet 
made the lightweight class." Mulvihill, supra note 29, at 168. Supervisors within PHA 
itself apparently were hostile to the public housing program, particularly in the late 
forties and early fifties, leading Senator Lyndon Johnson to remark: "PHA adminis-
trators are dragging their feet on housing and opposing it." J. Housing, N'ov, 1959, 
p. 355. 
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out its responsibilities when it supplied the maximum amount of 
low-rent housing, whether segregated or integrated.39 
IV. ACTION OF PHA SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 
AND TITLE VI 
A. PHA's Interpretation of the Executive Order and Issuance of 
Regulations 
Although several courts had declared that governmentally sup-
ported segregation in public housing was constitutionally imper-
missible,40 it was not until 1962 that a nationwide policy prohibiting 
discrimination in federally assisted housing was unequivocally estab-
lished. In that year, Executive Order 11063 recognized that racially 
discriminatory practices denied Negroes the benefit of housing fi. 
nanced through federal assistance, that such practices produced other 
forms of discrimination, and that federal assistance to segregated 
housing was consequently "unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with the 
public policy of the United States .... "41 
Section 101 of the Order directs the appropriate federal agency 
to take all action necessary to "prevent discrimination" because of 
.race if the contract for federal assistance was entered into after 
November 20, 1962; section 102 directs the agency to use its good 
offices and take other appropriate action permitted by law, including 
the institution of appropriate litigation, "to promote the abandon-
ment of discriminatory practices" if the contract was entered into 
prior to November 20, 1962.42 Pursuant to the Order, PHA issued 
regulations requiring the inclusion of an antidiscrimination covenant 
in all annual-contribution contracts initially consummated after 
39. At one time PHA officially approved the maintenance of separate facilities. Its 
1949 Low Rent Housing Manual provided: "The housing provided for all races shall 
be of substantially the same quality, services, facilities and conveniences with respect 
to all standards and criteria for planning and designing." PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTllA• 
TION, Low-RENT HousING MANUAL§ 207.1 (1949). This provision has since been deleted. 
40. See cases cited note 33 supra; Note, 107 U. PA. L. REV, 515, 518 n.23 (1959). 
41. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962). Similarly, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that "No person ••• shall, on the ground of race ••• 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis• 
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 78 
Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). 
42. Section 101 provides that "all action necessary and appropriate to prevent dis• 
crimination because of race, color, creed, or national origin ••• provided in whole or 
in part with the aid of loans, advances, grants, or contributions hereat ter agreed to be 
made by the Federal Government ••• " be taken by the appropriate federal agency. 
(Emphasis added.) Section 102 provides that the federal agency should use its "good 
offices and take other appropriate action permitted by law, including the institution of 
appropriate litigation, if required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory prac• 
tices with respect to residential property and related facilities heretofore provided with 
Federal financial assistance of the types referred to in Section 101 •••• " (Emphasis 
added.) 
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November 20.43 It appears, however, that in several aspects PHA did 
not fully exercise the power available to it under the Order. 
First, it would seem that PHA, like all of the constituent agencies 
of HHF A, can be charged with interpreting too restrictively the 
scope of section 102. PHA decided that the phrase "good offices" in 
section 102 precluded it from taking measures other than those of 
an informal, conciliatory nature, and thus disregarded the language 
immediately following that phrase: "other appropriate action per-
mitted by law, including the institution of appropriate litigation if 
required." PHA also felt that the directive in section 102 "to pro-
mote the abandonment of discriminatory practices" was less impera-
tive than the corresponding directive in section 101 "to prevent 
discrimination," and therefore curtailed the application of the former 
section. Thus, the Executive Order, as interpreted by PHA's regu-
lations, permitted the federal government to act only against dis-
crimination in those projects where the local authority and PHA 
had entered into an initial agreement after the effective date of the 
Order. Consequently, the great bulk of public housing remained 
unaffected. 44 
Second, PHA restricted the scope of the Order to the tenant-selec-
tion procedures of local authorities, thus leaving open the possibility 
that local authorities would not remedy past discrimination in 
site selection and might continue to construct projects in either 
all-Negro or all-white sections of the community. PHA thus rendered 
the achievement of desegregation in such projects virtually impos-
sible, since it has been demonstrated to be extremely difficult to 
place whites in projects located in all-Negro neighborhoods.45 
Third, it appears that local authorities, when constructing proj-
ects after November 1962, could satisfy the standards of the PHA 
regulations by merely including within the annual-contributions 
contract a covenant assuring PHA that it would not discriminate in 
its operation of the projects,46 since PHA apparently made only 
negligible efforts to ensure actual compliance.47 
43. 24 C.F.R. § 1500.6(b)(2) (1964). This regulation, with the exception of one pro-
vision, has since been superseded. See note 48 infra and accompanying text. 
44. See generally Sloane, One Year's Experience: Current and Potential Impact of 
the Housing Order, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv.' 457 (1964); Sloane & Freedman, The 
Executive Order on Housing: The Constitutional Basis for What It Fails To Do, 9 
How. L.J. 1, 3-5 (1963). 
45. See, for example, the problems encountered by New York City when it attempted 
to situate whites in the Grand House Project near Harlem. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1958, 
§ R, p: I, col. 8. 
46. The alleged fears of the building industry that the _Executive Order would 
cause a drastic retrenchment in home building proved to be unsubstantiated, as were 
similar fears that southern communities would discontinue their public housing pro-
grams. One month after PHA had promulgated its regulations, only five southern 
communities had cancelled their PHA contracts. Moreover, several small communities 
in Georgia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas signed final subsidy contracts 
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At present the regulations are, with the exception of one provision, 
of historical importance only, since they have been superseded by the 
regulations issued by PHA pursuant to Title VI.48 This exception 
exists because the Executive Order prohibits discrimination on the 
ground of creed while Title VI does not. Therefore, any instances of 
religious discrimination will be resolved under the more narrow 
confines of the Executive Order regulations rather than under the 
greater protection afforded by the Title VI regulations.40 
B. PHA's Interpretation of Title VI and Issuance of Regulations 
The coverage of Title VI is much broader than that of the 
Executive Order, since the title provides that all funds disbursed by 
PHA shall be utilized in a non-discriminatory fashion by the local au-
thorities regardless of the date of the agreement between PHA and the 
local agency.50 Moreover, the regulations promulgated by HHFA, 
which are binding upon PHA and have been incorporated by refer-
ence into PHA's own regulations,51 are also much more comprehen-
sive. For example, under HHFA's regulations local authorities are 
required to submit periodic compliance reports and to provide 
access to all materials which the federal agency may need either for 
its own use or for the information of a beneficiary of the program. 
-In addition, the federal agency is required to conduct periodic com-
pliance investigations of its own. Consequently, in contrast to the 
Executive Order, which provided for none of these measures, much 
of the burden of the enforcement of Title VI falls upon the federal 
agency rather than upon the individual, although an aggrieved per-
son may also lodge a complaint under the regulations.52 Furthermore, 
covering over seven hundred units; eighty-five preliminary contracts in the south 
signed before November 20 were amended by agreement with local authorities to in-
clude the antidiscrimination clause. However, the effect of such compliance was for 
the most part meaningless, according to observers, because the sites of the projects 
were chosen on a segregated basis. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1963, p. 4, col. 1. 
47. The small number of complaints processed by HHFA seems to substantiate this 
observation. See Sloane, supra note 44. 
48. 30 Fed. Reg. 132 (1965). 
49. "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 1500.6, ••• the procedure prescribed in 
the HHFA regulations [24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12 (1964)], as implemented by the Public 
Housing Administration in this § 1500.7 [30 Fed. Reg. 132 (1965)], shall apply with 
respect to any complaint of discrimination on the ground of race, color or national 
origin in the low-rent housing program • • • • The procedure prescribed in § 1500,6 
shall apply only to complaints of discrimination on the basis of creed." 30 Fed, Reg. 
132 (1965). 
50. Section 2000d of title VI, partially quoted note 39 supra, suggests that all 
federal assistance is preconditioned upon the absence of discriminatory practices on 
the part of the recipient. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12 (1964), the regulations issued by HHFA 
pursuant to title VI, make this explicit by stating that the regulations apply to "Federal 
financial assistance extended under any • • • program • • • after [Dec. 4, 1964] • • , 
pursuant to an application approved prior to [Dec. 4, 1964] •••• " 24 C.F.R. § 1,3 (1964), 
51. 30 Fed. Reg. 132 (1965). 
52. PHA Circular dated December 30, 1964, explaining 30 Fed. Reg. 132 (24 C.F,R, 
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the Title VI regulations of HHF A guard against both tenant and 
site discrimination, a matter which was uncertain under the Executive 
Order regulations. 53 
It is arguable that PHA did not possess the requisite authority 
under the Executive Order to end discrimination completely in the 
projects which it then supervised.54 Under Title VI and the regu-
lations issued pursuant to it, however, that authority undoubtedly 
exists; the remaining proble!fi is how that authority may be best 
exercised. 
C. PHA's Free Choice Plan 
Because governmentally supported segregation in public housing 
appears to have been the result of both discriminatory site selection 
and discriminatory tenant placement, proper implementation of 
Title VI and the regulations demands that PHAhalt the perpetration 
of both evils by local authorities. In order to obviate discriminatory 
tenant placement procedures, PHA has devised what has been termed 
the "Louisville" or "free choice" plan. 55 It appears that PHA has not 
only informed local authorities that such a plan is sufficient to com-
ply with the mandate of Title VI, but has also, in those states which 
§ 1500.7), reaffirms Title VI and HHFA's regulations to the extent that all public housing 
projects are subject to the prohibition of discrimination, but notes that remedies for 
noncompliance with the regulations may differ depending on the date when the project 
was initially covered by a financial assistance project. All contracts for annual contri-
butions which initially cover a project on or after January 3, 1965, and any preliminary 
loan contracts must contain a proviso that the local authority will comply with Title 
VI and the HHFA and PHA regulations issued pursuant to it. (This categorical state-
ment is subject to the exception that PHA will supply the requisite advances to liqui-
date valid outstanding obligations even though the local authority fails to include the 
covenant in a preliminary contract entered into before January 3, 1965.) If the local 
authority fails to comply with the covenant, PHA may treat the authority as if it were 
in substantial default under the contract and may, at its option, demand that the 
authority either convey title to or deliver possession of the projects. In contrast, if 
the annual contributions contract was entered into before January 3, 1965, the local 
authority, when it next requests funds, must submit a "Statement of Local Authority 
as to Compliance under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." The statement 
must cover all projects for which funds are to be disbursed and is similar in import 
to the covenant included in the preliminary loan and annual contributions contracts 
mentioned above. If the authority fails to comply, PHA may refuse to enter into 
further financial assistance contracts of various types, may declare a substantial breach 
or default of the contract, or may take other action authorized by law. 
53. See text accompanying note 45 supra: Since September 1, 1965, PHA has re-
quired that site selections comply with Title VI and that the local authority submit 
sufficient information to PHA so that a specific determination may be made that the 
selection is in accordance with the policies established by PHA under Title VI. PUBLIC 
HOUSING Al>MINIS1RATION, Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 205.1 (1949). 
54. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text. 
55. It would seem that PHA will have to employ another city as a model for its 
free choice plan, since Louisville has recently switched to a first-come-first-served ap-
proach. The Louisville authority instituted the new plan after it realized that the 
free choice plan, in conjunction with segregated site selection, had resulted in only 
minimal desegregation of the public housing projects in Louisville. Louisville Times, 
Sept. 9, 1965. 
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do not have more rigorous antidiscrimination policies, recommended 
it as the most desirable of those plans which may legitimately be 
adopted.56 
The free choice plan contemplates that all applicants for public 
housing in a given locality will be permitted to designate which 
projects they wish to inhabit and that no tenant will be placed in a 
project which he has not specified as acceptable. Theoretically, such 
a plan affords the optimum balance between what some have viewed 
as two conflicting objectives:57 it allows an individual to live near 
and associate with those he chooses, yet permits the Negro to secure 
access to all housing accommodations. The assumption underlying the 
plan is that once the government formally discards its discriminatory 
tenant-selection procedures, members of both races are freed from 
the effects of governmentally supported discrimination and thus 
may choose, as their personal feelings dictate, to live in projects pre-
dominantly inhabited by members of their own race, members of 
the other race, or members of both races in varying proportions. 
Therefore, the argument continues, if segregation remains after the 
government assumes a neutral stance, it must be the consequence 
of private action, reflect the desire of most members of both races 
to live among their own people, and thus be an improper subject 
for governmental legislation. 
This reasoning, upon which PHA h~s apparently predicated its 
support of the free choice plan, seems vulnerable to several objec-
tions. First, the free choice plan approved by PHA goes only to the 
eradication of discriminatory tenant selection procedures; it com-
pletely neglects and has no effect upon past discriminatory site 
selection methods.58 Thus, the neutrality which PHA supposedly 
offers when it condones implementation of a free choice plan is 
only a half-measure of neutrality. Free choice in a setting of past 
governmentally approved segregation, a setting in which PHA now 
appears to be tacitly·acquiescing, would not seem to be a free choice 
at all. It seems impossible for PHA now to correct directly the dis-
criminatory site selection of the past; the projects obviously cannot 
be moved, and, regardless of the label which PHA attaches to those 
56. Letter From Galen Martin, Executive Director of the Kentucky Commission on 
Human Rights, to Harold Fleming, Executive Vice President of the Potomac Insti• 
tute, Oct. 11, 1965, copy on file with the Michigan Law Review. The official policy of PHA 
is not to recommend any particular plan; rather, any plan or method which will assure 
compliance with Title VI in the opinion of PHA is acceptable. Letter From Joseph 
Burstein, General Counsel of the Public Housing Administration, to the Michigan 
Law Review, December 3, 1965. This official position is also implicit in PHA Circular, 
August 27, 1965, describing methods of local administration which will ensure com• 
pliance with Title VI. 
57. See OPEN OCCUPANCY vs. FORCED HOUSING UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(Avins ed. 1963); Avins, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom 
of Choice, 6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960). 
58. See notes 46 and 55 supra. 
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projects, present and potential tenants will view a project constructed 
by the government in a Negro or white neighborhood as a Negro 
or white project, respectively. Consequently, if PHA wishes to as-
sume a truly nondiscriminatory position, it seems that it must adopt 
an affirmative approach in its tenant-placement procedures in order 
to counterbalance the negative features of governmentally supported 
segregation in site selection. 
A second argument may be directed against the propriety of , 
PHA's free choice plan. One of the underlying premises of present 
antidiscrimination legislation affecting all phases of society is that 
government has contributed indirectly to the maintenance of dis-
crimination and that, as a result, the reluctance of the Negro to 
break through into the white community can be attributed par-
tially to the barriers which the government helped to construct.59 
Consequently, one objective of antidiscrimination legislation is 
affirmatively to redress past governmental policies. Therefore, if 
the individual Negro is now justifiably skeptical about the welcome 
which would be afforded his arrival in a previously all-white com-
munity where past governmental support of prejudicial attitudes 
was indirect only, 60 it seems likely that he would be even more 
dubious of moving into an all-white public housing project in 
which governmental actions have been directly responsible for 
segregated living patterns. 61 
Various arguments may be raised in defense of the free choice 
plan. One of the most appealing justifications which PHA might 
marshal! in its favor is that the most "militant" establishment in 
the executive branch-the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare-and the federal courts have approved free choice plans 
as proper means to accomplish desegregation of southern schools 
under the mandate of Title VI.62 The drawing of such a compari-
59. That such reluctance does exist has been acknowledged by many federal courts 
in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965); 
Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W .D. Okla. 1965). See generally Miller, Govern-
ment's Responsibility for Residential Segregation, in RACE AND PROPERTY 58 (1964). 
60. See Rubin, The Negro Wish To Move: The Boston Case, 15 J. Social Issues 
No. 4, p. 4 (1959). Studies of those Negroes who have pioneered Negro entry into 
formerly all-white communities reveal that they decided upon their course of action 
despite the difficulties which they believed would be encountered. See, e.g., NORTHWOOD 
8: BARTH, NEIGHBORHOODS IN TRANSITION-THE NEW AMERICAN PIONEERS AND THEIR 
NEIGHBORS (1965). 
61. See CONNECTICUT COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, RACIAL INTEGRATION IN PUBLIC Hous-
ING PROJECTS IN CONNECTICUT (1955). 
62. The Office of Education _of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW) has fixed minimum standards to be used-in determining the qualifications for 
schools applying for federal financial aid: "The fall of 1967 is set as the target date 
for the extension of desegregation to all grades of school systems not fully desegregated 
in 1965-66 •••• " A good-faith start requires desegregation of at least four grades for 
the 1965-66 school year. Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, General Statement of Policies Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
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son, however, appears ·untenable for several reasons. Perhaps the 
most persuasive is that the courts, in fashioning remedies to end 
discriminatory state action, have accorded a special status to the 
problem of desegregating the schools.63 The Supreme Court, in 
the second Brown decision, 64 recognized that unique administrative 
problems are involved in school desegregation,65 and therefore did 
not require its immediate effectuation. In contrast, in all other 
areas, of state-aided discrimination, the federal courts have noted 
the absence of these administrative factors and have consequently 
ordered the state or local officials to desegregate at once. 00 
Furthermore, HEW and the courts do not view the free choice 
plan as necessarily the final answer to the problem of desegregating 
the school systems of the South.67 The all-too-deliberate speed with 
which southern school authorities have moved in the decade since 
Brown has caused the courts to view skeptically the proposed efforts 
of southern educators to desegregate.68 Consequently, while per-
1964 Respecting Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools (1965). The Fifth 
Circuit has "attached great weight" to these standards, and will not accept a lesser 
degree of desegregation, although in certain instances it may demand more, Singleton 
v. Jackson Munic. Separate School Dist., Civil No. 22527, 5th Cir., Jan. 26, 1966. Sec 
also Singleton v. Jackson Munic. Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965); 64 
MICH. L. REv. 340 (1965); accord, Price v. Denison Independent School Dist., 348 F,2d 
1010 (5th Cir. 1965). 
63. See Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 531-32 &: n.4 (1963). 
64. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
65. The Court listed considerations such as "problems related to administration, 
arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, 
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve 
a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and re-
vision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing 
problems." Id. at 300-01. 
66. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the contention that the concept of 
"all deliberate speed" should be extended to areas other than education in the public 
schools. See Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). The Court has reasoned that "the 
rights ••• asserted are, like all such rights, present rights; they arc not merely hopes 
to some future enjoyment of some formalistic constitutional promise •••• [U]nlcss there 
is an ovenvhclmingly compelling reason, they are to be promptly fulfilled, The second 
Brown decision is but a narrowly drawn, and carefully limited, qualification upon 
usual precepts of constitutional adjudication and is not to be unnecessarily expanded 
in application.'' Id. at 533. (Emphasis in original.) See generally Greenberg, Race 
Relations and Group Interests in the Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 503 (1959); Hartman, 
The Right to Equal Educational opportunities as a Personal and Present Right, 9 
WAYNE L. REv. 424 (1963). 
67. In Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 86 Sup. Ct. 224 (1965) (per curiam), the court allowed the imple-
mentation of a free choice plan, but was careful to note that "such freedom [of choice] 
exists in a practical sense only when a pupil wishing to attend a school with substantial 
numbers of the other race has an unequivocal and realizable right to do so.'' Id. at 
315 n.5; accord, Felder v. Hamett County Bd. of Educ., 349 F.2d 366, 367 (1965) (per 
curiam). The Supreme Court vacated Bradley and remanded the case to the district 
court for its consideration of the faculty as well as the student desegregation aspects 
of the school board's desegregation plan. 86 Sup. Ct. 224. (1965) (per curiam); sec 64 
MICH. L. REv. 692 (1966). 
68. See Goss v. Board· of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). The Fifth Circuit has warned 
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mitting the implementation of free choice plans throughout the 
South, both the courts and HEW have been careful to note that 
such plans -will be approved only if the choice is in reality a free 
one and desegregation is actually accomplished within three years.69 
Where the mere institution of a free choice plan appears insufficient 
to overcome the multitudinous difficulties inherent in any attempt 
to desegregate a school system, it seems certain that the plan will not 
be accorded continued judicial approval.70 The trial which is to be 
given free choice plans in the schools, however, has already been 
granted public housing projects for approximately three years, with 
patently unsatisfactory results. Consequently, if a comparison is to 
be drawn between PHA's policies and those of HEW·and the courts, 
it appears that PHA should discard the free choice plan and adopt 
a substitute which will more effectively meet the mandates of the 
Executive Order and Title VI. 
recalcitrant school boards that "the later the start, the shorter the time allowed for 
transition." Lockett v. Board of Educ., 342 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1965); accord, Single-
ton v. Jackson Munic. Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965). See generally 
64 MICH. L. REv. 340 (1965). 
69. Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.) (concurring opinion), vacated and 
remanded per curiam on, other grounds, 86 Sup. Ct. 224 (1965). Judges Sobeloff and 
:Bell emphasized that the court viewed the free choice plan as an experiment to end 
existing discrimination, not as the final answer to the problem. Where the free choice 
plan is "merely a strategic retreat to a new position behind which the forces of opposi-
tion will regroup," the free choice plan will be found insufficient. Id. at 322. Accord, 
Kemp v. :Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965). The Fifth Circuit, moreover, although 
approving the free choice or free transfer plans suggested by HEW, has strongly inti-
mated that such plans will be suitable only if they in fact attain integration of the 
schools: "In retrospect, the second Brown opinion clearly imposes on public school 
authorities the duty to provide an integrated school system. Judge Parker's well known 
dictum ('The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely 
forbids discrimination.') in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955), 
should be laid to rest. It is inconsistent with Brown and the later development of 
decisional and statutory law in the area of civil rights." Singleton v. Jackson Munk. 
Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 730 n.5 (5th Cir. 1965); accord, Kemp v. :Beasley, 
352 F.2d 14, 21 (8th Cir. 1965). In addition, HEW's enchantment with the free choice 
plan appears to be evaporating. A force of two hundred investigators and mediators 
is now being readied to secure full compliance -with the agency's antidiscrimination 
requirements, and new guidelines are being prepared to deal particularly with "so-
called 'freedom of choice' plans that many Southern school districts have adopted as 
a means of token integration while avoiding full-scale desegregation." N.Y. Times, Feb. 
8, 1966, p. 24, col. 4. 
70. In Dowell v. School :Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W .D. Okla. 1965), the court took 
judicial notice that resistance existed in all-white communities to Negroes who seek to 
obtain housing there, that discrimination was practiced by some realtors and financial 
institutions, and that Negroes, on the average, were economically restricted to a smaller 
housing market. It theri concluded that such factors contributed _to the Negroes' in-
ability to exercise a substantial freedom of choice in determining their place of resi-
dence and that the resulting residential segregation caused similar patterns of segre• 
gation in the schools. As a result, the court found that the city school board, by 
adopting a neutral free transfer plan rather than an affirmative policy to desegregate, 
was in a negative fashion contributing to increased segregation within the city. Conse-
quently, it ordered the school board to take clear, affirmative, and aggressive a<;tion 
to bring about desegregation of the schools. Id. at 982. 
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V. POSSIBLE PHA PROCEDURES FOR ENSURING AT LEAST MINIMAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND TITLE VI 
Because PHA has approved the intentional placement of public 
housing projects in segregated neighborhoods, because little can 
be done about such placement at present, and because the free 
choice plan of tenant selection has proved insufficient to erase the 
imprimatur of discrimination placed upon site selection by PHA, 
a more affirmative antidiscriminatory tenant-placement policy must 
be adopted by PHA. Several localities71 have instituted the first-
come-first-served plan, which appears to meet both the minimal re-
quirements of federal policy72 and the need for administrative sim-
plicity. The plan requires that all applications for housing be filed 
in the central office of the local agency. Applicants are then placed 
in existing vacancies in any of the projects under the jurisdiction of 
the local authority in the order of application, without regard to 
race.73 Handling of the applications from a central office rather than 
on a project-to-project basis seems essential to the success of the plan. 
If an individual-project approach is utilized, then the first-come-first-
served plan may in substance revert back to a free choice plan, since 
both whites and Negroes would probably tend to apply only for those 
projects inhabited by members of their own race. 
In public housing projects today the annual tenant turnover 
averages approximately twenty-five to thirty per cent. Thus desegre-
gation of all projects under the first-come-first-served plan would 
theoretically tak_e place in three to four years, which is roughly the 
length of time during which PHA has advocated the ineffective free 
choice plan. This time span is approximately equal to the period 
which HEW and the federal courts contemplate will be necessary 
for the total implementation of the free choice plans in the southern 
schools. Thus, in terms of the length of time necessary to achieve the 
ultimate goal of desegregation of governmental facilities, it seems 
that the first-come-first-served plan in housing and the free choice 
plan in schools are closely parallel. 
In addition, while the free choice plan only ensures that tenant-
selection procedures may proceed on a nondiscriminatory basis, the 
first-come-first-served plan guarantees that the effects of past discrimi-
71. See the discussion of the change in Louisville's public housing program, note 55 
supra. Jersey. City has recently implemented a similar plan. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1964, 
p. 12, col. I. 
72. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
73. If a local authority institutes a first-come-first-served plan, PHA requires that 
the plan shall provide for one of the following dispositions if an applicant refused to 
accept the offered vacancy on any ground: that he remain in first place on the appli• 
cation list; that he remain in first place but if he rejects suitable vacancies on a stated 
number of occasions (two or three, for example) he be moved to last place; or that he 
be moved to last place. PHA Circular, August 2'1, 1965. 
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nation in both tenant- and site-selection procedures will be substan-
tially mitigated, since tenants will be placed in all projects without 
regard to race. Thus the tendency of both whites and Negroes under 
the free choice plan to view projects as white or Negro and to 
"choose" accordingly is considerably reduced by the first-come-first-
served plan. 
Various practical arguments have been offered in opposition to 
the first-come-first-served plan. It has been asserted that many local 
authorities are nearing the brink of financial disaster and that imple-
mentation of the plan would cause impending insolvency to become 
a reality.74 It has been demonstrated that on the average rents paid 
by white tenants in public housing projects are higher than those 
paid by Negroes;75 consequently, it is contended that if Negroes 
move into formerly all-white projects, or unwilling whites are forced 
into previously all-Negro projects, then the whites will move out 
of public housing entirely, more Negroes will move into the projects 
in their place, and the resulting decrease in rental income will spell 
the authority's financial doom. 
The foregoing argument, however, would appear susceptible 
to several objections. Although it seems fairly well established that 
whites may rebel against the introduction of Negroes into their midst 
if previous interracial contact has been negligible, 76 studies conducted 
in public housing projects have concluded that personal interracial 
association after Negroes enter formerly all-white projects causes 
prejudicial attitudes to diminish considerably.77 Moreover, there ap-
pears to be a positive correlation between the amount of interracial 
exposure and the degree of tolerance and acceptance manifested by 
each race for the other. 78 Therefore, it may be doubted whether an 
exodus of whites from public housing projects would result from the 
establishment of racially mixed projects. Furthermore, it appears 
74. See Mulvihill, supra note 29, at 175-78. 
75. Ibid. 
76. See notes 60 and 61 supra and accompanying text. 
77. DEUTSCH & COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A 
SOCIAL EXPERIMENT (1951); WILNER, WACKLEY & COOK, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INTER· 
RACIAL HOUSING (1955); CONNECTICUT COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note 61; 
Spiegel, Tenants' Intergroup Attitudes in a Public Housing Project With Declining 
White Population, 21 PHYLON 30 (1960). 
78. See authorities cited note 77 supra. Two particular difficulties arise when these 
studies are evaluated. First, the projects investigated were all located in the North, 
with the possible geographic exception of Baltimore. However, the city of Baltimore 
has recently been noted for its racial harmony. See Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 
810, 822 (4th Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion). Therefore, the conclusion of these studies 
.that intermixing of the races lessens prejudice might hold true only in northern com-
munities. Second, the investigators interviewed only those whites who had remained 
in the projects after integration had been introduced. It is therefore plausible that 
part of the apparently increased acceptance of Negroes by whites may be attributable 
to the fact that the more prejudiced whites simply moved out of the project before 
the investigations were initiated. 
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inappropriate that the duty of PHA to oversee the desegregation of 
public housing should depend on the amount of money necessary to 
its accomplishment. If the financial stability of a local agency would 
be imperiled by racial heterogeneity, it would seem that the answer 
should be increased funds rather than continued discrimination.70 
It has also been alleged that the implementation of the first-come-
first-served plan, if it does not lead to the financial ruin of local 
authorities, will at least cause whites to withdraw from public hous-
ing projects. As a result, public housing would be as segregated after 
the institution of the plan as before and present segregation would 
thus be perpetuated rather than ended. It seems doubtful that the 
first-come-first-served plan would cause one hundred per cent Negro 
tenancy of public housing projects;80 if such a result seemed possible, 
however, the local authority might consider methods which would 
maintain integrated housing facilities. For example, the New York 
City Housing Authority now "encourages" applicants to enter pro-
jects where they would provide better racial balance.81 Moreover, the 
utilization of affirmative programs to accomplish integration in other 
areas of state action82 suggests that approaches similar to the use of 
benign quotas may now be accorded a less hostile judicial reception 
than in the past. 83 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The failure of PHA to achieve more than token desegregation of 
the nation's public housing program seems traceable to its reluctance 
to undertake action which would effectively offset its own past dis• 
criminatory site- and tenant-selection practices as well as those of 
local authorities. If PHA is to remove the discrimination which now 
taints the nation's low-rent housing programs, and present federal 
79. The Housing Act limits annual contributions to an amount "equal to the annual 
yield, at the applicable going Federal rate plus 1 per ccntum, upon the development 
or acquisition cost of the low-rent housing or slum clearance project involved." 50 Stat, 
891 (1937), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1964)~ 
80. See authorities note 77 supra. 
81. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 16, col. 7. 
82. See, e.g., Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, 199 N.E.2d 375, 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964), where the New York Court of Appeals held that a 
local school board, in establishing school attendance lines, may attempt to redress 
racial imbalance in the schools caused by residential segregation. Cf. Vetere v. Allen, 
15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174 (per curiam), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 60 (1965). But see 
Wanner v. County School Bd., 245 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Va. 1965). 
83. To date three courts have considered the issue of benign quotas. Compare 
Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954), and Banks v. Housing 
Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1st Dist. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 
(1954), with Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941). The subject of benign 
quotas has been accorded extensive treatment in the law reviews. Two of the better 
articles are Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race 
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How, 
L.J. 30 (1960). 
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antidiscrimination policies strongly suggest that it must, then it 
seems that PHA should consider implementing the following sug-
gestions. First, it should ensure that future low-rent housing projects· 
are placed in racially mixed neighborhoods or are dispersed in smaller 
units throughout the community.84 The adoption of such an ap-
proach, however, will not affect the bulk of low-rent housing already 
constructed in homogeneous neighborhoods. Second, since the free 
choice plan now extolled by PHA has proved inadequate in remov-
ing the stigma of past discrimination, PHA should discard it, and 
demand that local authorities institute a first-come-first-served plan. 
Through these methods PHA should be able to guarantee open ac-
cess to all public housing projects, not merely to those labeled 
"Negro" or "white." 
Jordan D. Luttrell 
84. See notes 34 and 53 supra. 
890 Michigan Law Review 
APPENDIX 
The following data have been compiled from the two latest Public Housing Admin-
istration's Low Rent Housing Directories of December 31, 1964, and June 30, 1965, con-
taining statistics as of January 6, 1965, and July 6, 1965, respectively. The purpose of the 
table below is to offer a statistical comparison of the racial composition of all projects 
currently under management in the federally administered low-rent housing program 
according to the definitions formulated by the Public Housing Administration. The 
analysis of ·the statistics should give the observer an indication of the effect of Title VI 
and of the HHFA regulations issued pursuant to it during the first six months in which 
the regulations were in operation. 
Racial Composition' of Project• 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
Region 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/65 1/65 6/6S 
New York 304 326 2 2 1 2 3 3 0 0 21 21 75 79 0 0 6 
Philadelphia 137 143 4 4 4 4 16 15 0 0 100 103 59 63 0 0 II 
Atlanta 9 15 6 6 225 248 0 0 0 0 610 621 636 656 0 0 4 
Chicago 164 177 5 8 9 9 8 8 0 0 75 74 138 155 0 0 1 
Fort Worth 51 56 3 3 141 158 2 4 0 0 126 132 215 239 9 9 2 
San Francisco 187 190 25 27 0 0 2 2 1 1 IO 13 90 93 1 1 0 
Total 852 907 45 50 380 421 31 32 1 1 942 964 1213 1285 IO 10 24 
DEFlNmONS OF RACIAL COMPOsmoN:• 
0--Integrated (white and more than one nonwhite, including at least one Negro 
family) 
I-Integrated, white and other nonwhite 
2-Segregated within project, by building or site 
3-Mixed occupancy-with limitations or segregated patterns 
4-Not defined 
5-All nonwhite 
6-All white (with or without Latin-American) 
7-All Latin-American 
9-Not Reported 
STATES INCLUDED IN EACH PHA R.EGioNt: 
New York-Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, and Rhode Island. 
Philadelphia-Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. 
Atlanta-Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee. 
Chicago-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
Fort Worth-Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Okla• 
homa, and Texas. 
San Francisco-Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Washington. 
• As defined by Public Housing Administration in its Low-Rent Housing Directory. 
t Includes only those states which have projects actually in operation. 
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